(By Thomas Wallgren; Translated from the Swedish by T. P. Uschanov)

(iv) The fourth dimension of constitutions concerns democracy. Can we view the draft constitution of the EU as an expression of the will of us, the citizens? The question has no unequivocal answer. But when it comes to Finland, it is hard to answer in the affirmative.

When Finland entered the European Union in 1994 after a referendum, it was of fundamental importance that we saw the union as an organ of international cooperation between independent member states. Both then and later, the government and the citizens have clearly rejected the idea that Finland should be a member in an union with a different character.

The problem is that the European Union which is coming into being with the constitution cannot any longer be described in good faith as an organization for cooperation between independent countries. Neither can it be described as a federal state, and it is doubtful if it can be called a nation state. As has often been remarked, we therefore lack exact concepts for describing the political status of the European Union, its member countries and their citizens.

This is the exact point where we can agree with those who say that ”the EU is something completely new”. But in the light of the discussion above we also see now that the ”completely new” is not as new as some have thought. The proponents of the lack of criteria are saying that the unique nature of the European Union ends the relevance of the norms by which the constitutions of states and international agreements between states can be assessed. They are right in the following, much more restricted sense. The parliament and the cabinet must decide how Finland should decide on the ratification of the EU constitution, and the decision must be taken on the basis of the constitution Finland has. In the constitution there are no provisions covering this concrete case, so the parliament will be compelled to apply the provisions concerning international treaties. But this juridical formality has very limited implications for the substantial, political and normative significance which the EU constitution has for us.

Democratic states where the rule of law prevails are not a thing one can decree into being; they can only be created through processes which give meaning and substance to the juridical decisions about democracy. There are strong grounds for saying that the EU can hope to become a democratic state where the rule of law prevails only if the constitution of the union receives the confidence and support of the citizens in referendums.

The most important single argument is Article I.1.1 of the draft constitution, which speaks of the constitution as ”[r]eflecting the will of the citizens”. This is a good clause. But what it says must also be true. Article I.1.1 can only receive positive meaning through justice and through informed referendums in all EU countries.

In Finland other clauses are equally important. After the referendum in the autumn of 1994, Finland has already surrendered power to the EU three times without the people being given a chance to vote on the decisions. The three transfers of power were connected with the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice treaty (2000) and the euro (2001). But the constitution will transfer power from Finland to the EU a fourth time. One must be a rather hardened enemy of referendums if one claims that the 1994 referendum authorized the Finnish parliament to transfer power to the EU in all four cases.

If we want the European Union about to be established by its new constitution to be a democratic state where the rule of law prevails, a referendum can hardly be avoided.

It is a different thing that the referendum is not a procedure free of problems either. We need just procedures which give a lot of room and time for analysis and public debate. The way towards referendums having good democratic qualities is always long and agonizing, and it requires a lot from those having the power and the money.

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Very few people believe that the member countries of the EU will be able to rise to the vertiginous democratic challenge by which they find themselves confronted. It is much more likely that the governments of the leading EU countries, the commission and the industrial lobby will have shoved the existing, formally chaotic and substantially in many cases confused draft constitution down the throats of their citizens and the governments of the servile countries. In this case the European Union would be created through a ”performative paradox”: at the same moment a political entity is created which in article I.2 of its constitution claims to represent democracy, the new entity shall abolish a central element of our democratic legacy.

Should this happen, the constitutional process is in danger of assuming a far more imporant role as an identity-decreeing event than was intended. The 2004 constitution of the European Union may perhaps be remembered afterwards as the end of an epoch. And perhaps it is the case that we are experiencing a transformation from an era which lasted from the middle of the seventeenth century to the end of the twentieth, and during which the dream of democracy shaped political history in our part of the world, to a new era, the era of the technosystem?

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This is a possible scenario of the future. But there is no reason to take it or any other scenario as a given. The world is full of know-it-alls who believe that they know how things will go. They enjoy telling us what is possible and what is not, what is ”worth” trying to achieve in politics and history and what is not. The fact remains that none of us knows what comes to be.

But there is another thing we do know.

We know that people who work together can realize unlikely alternatives of development. Those who fought for the eight-hour working day a century ago fought against all odds, and won. We can learn something from them.

It is still possible for us to try to let the new Europe, for which we are longing and which we need, to become a universally oriented and democratic community. To begin with, we should not give our hasty approval to the existing draft constitution. If necessary, Finland by itself can prevent the adoption of the constitution. If the cabinet and the parliament are not prepared to assume the responsibility of functioning as a brake, the citizens of Finland can do it. If the draft constitution has not been improved significantly from what it is today, we should kill it in cold blood through a referendum. If we vote ”no”, the constitution can not enter into force in any country.

Some are afraid of a ”no”, but their fears are groundless. Only through a ”no” to the European Union which is now being mooted can we hope for a thoroughly improved union. And only a thoroughly improved union can be up to the tasks awaiting it.

People sometimes ask me what kind of union I would be willing to vote for.

First, it should say in the EU constitution that all power belongs to the citizens and that citizens have the right of initiative and the power of decision in all the questions which belong to the remit of the EU.

Second, the EU should create in its constitution instruments of power which are at least as good for the guarding and realization of human rights, global justice and environmental protection as for the guarding and realization of the economic rights and benefits of corporations.

Third, the EU should devote itself solely to such issues where it is needed, such as minimum requirements for environmental protection and the controlling and taxation of capital. It should stop meddling with issues concerning which it has a bad reputation, such as agricultural policies, monetary policy and social policy.